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We have a tremendous capacity to change how we perceive and respond to the world as 54 our environment and goals change. One central part of this flexibility is our ability to implement 55 stimulus-response rules: policies for guiding behavior that allow us to make decisions quickly, 56
reasonably accurately, and with little subjective sense of effort (Asaad et al., 2000; Bunge, 2004;  both color and shape from the last choice-maximizes both reward likelihood and information 164 about the correct feature. On the first trial after feedback that the correct feature has changed, 165 subjects made this optimal choice 95% of the time (± 6.7% STD across sessions, sig. different 166 than chance, p < 0.0001, t(1,127) = 50.6). Similarly, across all rule-free trials where the subjects 167
were not rewarded on the last trial, they made the same novel choice 94% of the time (± 6.8%; 168 Figure 1F ; p < 0.0001, t(1,127) = 46.7). Moreover, rule-free choices in general were strongly 169 biased towards the options that would maximize information, as calculated from the the actual 170 pattern of choices and rewards that preceded these choices (Figure 1G; Rule adherence reduces firing rate 198 We recorded responses of individual neurons in OFC (n = 115 cells), VS (n = 103), and 199 DS (n = 204; recording sites in Figure 2A ). We first looked for hypothesized differences in 200 overall spiking activity during rule-based and rule-free decisions. Across the option viewing and 201 choice period (before feedback), we found that firing rates were systematically lower during 202
rule-based decisions in all three regions (example cells: Figure 2B ; population: Figure 2C ; VS: 203 reduction of 0.38 spikes/sec ± 0.14 STE across neurons, p < 0.0001; DS, reduction of 0.19 ± 0.10 204 spikes/sec, p < 0.0001; OFC, reduction of 0.17 ± 0.11 spikes/sec, p < 0.0001; permutation test 205 against expected difference with shuffled state labels). This was not due to differences in reward 206 expectation between the two conditions because reward-dependent changes in firing rate were 207 both smaller and in the opposite direction in all three regions (no reward -reward, VS: -0.28 ± 208 0.09, DS: -0.09 ± 0.07, OFC: -0.06 ± 0.07). Thus, if anything, we would be underestimating the 209 extent to which adhering to a rule decreases spiking activity in these regions because rule-based 210 trials were more likely to be rewarded than rule-free trials. than rule-free because of an attentional gate that warps the information available for decision-227 making, then we would see distributed changes in decision-making efficiency across all regions. 228
The rate of choice-predictive information per spike should increase during rule use across all 229 regions (Figure 3C, top) . Conversely, if rule-based decisions are more efficient due to a handoff 230 from deliberative to automatic decision-making structures (Figure 3C, bottom) , then choice-231 predictive information should selectively decrease in regions implicated in deliberative decision-232 making, as these regions are less involved in decision-making. 233
To compare the amount of choice-predictive information across rule-based and rule-free 234 decisions, we calculated the mutual information between each neuron's firing rate and the chosen 235 option separately for each condition (see Methods). Choice-predictive information was 236 increased during rule-based decisions, compared to rule-free decisions, in VS (rule-based: 237 average of 0.06 bits per trial ± 0.008 SEM, rule-free: 0.03 ± 0.004, p < 0.0001, z = 4.40, n = 103, 238
Wilcoxon rank sum test), DS (rule-based: 0.05 ± 0.004, rule-free: 0.03 ± 0.003, p < 0.0001, z = 239 6.21, n = 204), and OFC (rule-based: 0.07 ± 0.005, rule free: 0.05 ± 0.004, p < 0.0002, z = 3.77, 240 n = 115). Although mutual information was lower during rule-free decisions, some neurons did 241 still encode choice identity (one-way ANOVAs, predicting chosen stimulus identity from the 242 firing rate of each neuron; VS: n = 9/103, proportion = 0.09, p <0.04; DS: n = 23/204, proportion 243 = 0.11, p <0.0001; OFC: n = 14/115, proportion = 0.12, p < 0.001; one-sided binomial test for 244 difference from expected false positive rate of 0.05). Thus, choice information was increased 245 during rule-based decisions, but it was not completely absent during rule-free decisions. 246
The increase in choice information during rule-based decisions was not a trivial 247 consequence of the difference in firing rate between the two types of decisions. First, mutual 248 information typically increases with mean firing rate (Panzeri et al., 2007) Valentin et al., 2007) . We hypothesized that the 278 apparent discrepancy between these results could be due to fact that the BOLD signal may reflect 279 population measures other than average spiking, such as how densely or sparsely activity is 280 distributed across a population of neurons (Logothetis, 2008) . 281
Therefore, we next measured the sparsity of activity across VS, DS, and OFC during 282
rule-based and rule-free decision-making with the Gini index ( Figure S1B; First, we asked whether there were representational changes due to rule-based decision-318 making in general, rather than changes due to applying a specific rule. Because we had no 319 knowledge of which, if any, stimulus feature was focal during rule-free decisions, the rule-free 320 pseudopopulation necessarily combined information across trials in which different stimulus 321 features were focal. To create an equivalent rule-based pseudopopulation, rule-based trials were 322 sampled without regard for the rule. We first combined the data across VS, DS, and OFC, asking 323
how the distances between distributed choice representations changed across choices and goals 324 (Cukur et al., 2013) . We illustrate the pairwise distance between the representations of all 325 possible choices during both rule-based and rule-free decision-making as a representational 326 similarity matrix ( Figure 4B ; see Methods). 327
There was a representational shift between rule-based and rule-free decisions such that 328 similar choices were represented by more similar patterns of activity during rule-based decisions. 329
This representational shift was due to three changes in the representational similarity matrix 330 ( Figure 4C) . First, choice representations changed across rule state. Choice representations were 331 closer to themselves within choice type than between choice types (within: mean distance = -332 0.64 ± 0.10 STE, between = 0.59 ± 0.09, p < 0.0001, t(1,71) = 9.62, 95% CI = [0.98, 1.49]). 333
However, second, this was not due to a simple expansion of the representational space during 334
rule-based decisions because the average distance between choice representations was 335 unchanged across choice types (rule-based: mean distance = -0.59 ± 0.18, rule-free: mean 336 distance = -0.69 ± 0.08, p > 0.5, t(1,35) = 0.57, 95% CI for effect size = [-0.26, 0.47], paired t-337 test). Third, choices that shared a feature were closer than choices that did not share a feature 338 during rule-based decision-making (shared feature = -1.37 ± 0.18; no shared feature = 0.18 ± 339 0.18, p < 0.0001, t(1,34) = 6.12, 95% CI = [1.03, 2.06], two-sample t-test), but not during rule-340 free decision-making (shared feature = -0.74 ± 0.10; no shared feature = -0.65 ± 0.11, p > 0.5, 341 t(1,34) = 0.58, two-sample t-test). Thus, choice representations shifted to become more 342 organized with respect to stimulus categories during rule-based decisions. 343 We next asked whether these effects were the same across OFC, VS, or DS or driven by 344
representational changes in one regions. Choices were more similar within rule-based or rule-345 free decisions than between choice types in all three regions, indicating that representational 346 shifts did occur in each region (OFC: within = -0.47 ± 0.12 STE, between = 0.41 ± 0.10, p < 347 0.0001, t(1,71) = 7.16; VS: within = -0.50 ± 0.12, between = 0.45 ± 0.09, p < 0.0001, t(1,71) = 348 6.39; DS: within = -0.53 ± 0.11, between = 0.49 ± 0.09, p < 0.0001, t(1,71) = 7.74). Single-neuron choice tuning emphasizes category, rather than identity, during rule-393 based decisions 394
Because the choice representations were constructed from pseudopopulations rather than 395 simultaneously recorded populations, the increase in category encoding during rule-based 396 decisions could have been an artifact of how we combined activity across neurons. However, 397
representational changes at the population level should also be associated with changes in the 398 tuning of single neurons (Cukur et al., 2013) . Here, the changes in choice representations at the 399 population level suggested that single neurons should have less tuning for choice identity 400
(combination of color and shape), but more tuning for choice category (color or shape) during 401
rule-based decisions. 402
We quantified the relative amount of choice identity and choice category tuning in single 403 neurons with an "identity-category index" (see Methods). We found a significant decrease in the 404 identity-category index (relative increase in categorization) during rule-based in all three regions 405
( Figure 4C) There are multiple ways to increase the representational similarity of choices that differ 465 only in rule-irrelevant dimensions. In the warping hypothesis, these results could occur because 466 compressing irrelevant choice dimensions collapses any differences in the representation of 467 choices that differ in these dimensions. However, an increase in similarity could also be due to 468 an abstract rule identity signal. This is because simply encoding a blue-rule during blue star, 469 circle, and triangle choices could make the representation of these choices more similar, 470 regardless of shape. Thus, to meet the more stringent predictions of the warping hypothesis, rules 471 must change the way that choices are represented along the dimensions of neural activity that are 472 used to compute choice (see Methods)-not through a trivial effect of rule-encoding. 473
Subjects made the same choices for three different reasons which occurred with 474 approximately equal frequencies. For example, they could make a blue-star choice because they 475
were following a blue rule, following a star rule, or making rule-free decisions (Figure 6A ). This 476 meant that it was possible to identify the axes within neuron-dimensional space that predicted 477 blue choices, regardless of the goal, by marginalizing across these goals. We used targeted 478 dimensionality reduction to identify the directions in neuron-dimensional space that predicted 479 choice category (Figure 6B ; see Methods). This identified three coding dimensions that 480 predicted choice color and three coding dimensions that predicted choice shape-where coding 481 dimensions are the linear combinations of neuronal firing rates that best predicted changes in the 482 log odds of one choice category. As expected, choice-predictive coding dimensions were neither 483 identical nor orthogonal to the matching rule coding dimensions (mean angle between rule and 484 matching choice coding dimensions = 52.7 degrees, range across choice categories = [48.5, 485
56.2]). This implies that rule-adherence did affect how choices were represented along choice-486 predictive coding dimensions, but that changes in choice-predictive coding dimensions could not 487 be fully explained by encoding of the rule identity. 488
To understand how choice representations changed along choice-predictive coding 489 dimensions, we projected each pseudotrial into the subspace defined by these coding dimensions. 490
Formally, this meant that we found a low-dimensional projection of neural activity where 491 position corresponded to the decoded probability of choice. For illustration, the three choice 492 color coding dimensions were grouped into color subspace, while three choice shape coding 493 dimensions were grouped into shape subspace (Figure 6C) 3.32]). Thus, the projection of each pseudotrial onto these choice-predictive axes did indeed 498 predict choice. 499
However, the magnitude of the choice coding dimension projections differed, depending 500 on the subjects' goal: whether they chose the stimulus because the category was relevant to the 501 rule, irrelevant to the rule, or the result of rule-free decision-making (Figure 6D) . Next, we asked whether or not these same effects were apparent in all three regions 513
individually. We found nearly identical results in each of OFC, VS, and DS (Figure 6E ; see 514 We developed a new approach to defining rule-based and non-rule-based decisions in a 554 dynamic rule-based decision task and found that rule-based decisions made more efficient use of 555 limited neural resources than non-rule-based decisions. Fewer spikes were needed to generate 556 rule-based choices across a distributed network of decision-making regions. Further, although we 557 know that reducing neural activity tends to reduce information (Levy & Baxter, 1996) , choice 558 information was actually increased during rule-based choices. One way that implementing a rule 559 could improve the efficiency of decision-making is by changing how decision-making problems 560 are represented in the brain ( hemodynamic responses may track sparseness measures more than they track average firing. 578
Second, we found that the representational space of choices was more compact during rule-based 579 decisions than rule-free decisions in OFC, but in VS and DS, adhering to a rule expanded the 580 space of choice representations-increasing the distance between both similar and dissimilar 581 choices in the striatum, but not the cortex. 582
One interpretation of these results is that stimulus-response rules are implemented, in 583 part, through an attentional gate. This gate selects which features of choice options to prioritize 584 for processing at the expense of others ( In some cognitive theories, simple policies like rules are thought to reduce the 595 computational costs of coming to a decision largely because they eliminate the need to either 596 represent or to perform computations on rule-irrelevant information. However, here, the 597 compression in rule-irrelevant coding dimensions was matched, if not exceeded, by expansion in 598 rule-relevant dimensions. If there was some conserved decision-making quantity-like a fixed 599 amount of evidence or value that must be accumulated to come to a choice-then the expansion 600 of rule-relevant dimensions could be an inevitable consequence of compression in irrelevant 601 dimensions. This is because eliminating the encoding of rule-irrelevant information would shift 602 the choice process to over represent rule-relevant information in order to meet the fixed threshold 603
for generating a decision. Of course, it is not clear that value-based decisions depend on an 604
integrate-to-bound process (Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Rangel & Hare, 2010) , and a bottleneck in 605 visual attention could also lead to this type of conservation of evidence. Alternatively, it is also 606 possible that rule-relevant coding dimensions are expanded because expansion facilitates critical 607 rule-relevant computations, like the ability to classify the choice with respect to the current rule. 608
The idea that higher-order cognitive information can reshape sensory representations to 609 facilitate specific computations has support in both influential theories of prefrontal function 610 (Miller & Cohen, 2001) studies have not reported evidence that task rules can change the way that sensory features are 613
represented in the brain. Future work is necessary to determine whether the critical difference 614 between our study and these previous studies is one of task design, analysis method, or the fact 615 that this study targeted limbic regions commonly implicated in decision-making, rather than 616 prefrontal or extrastriate regions linked to controlling or executing visual attention ( During each session, between 1 and 4 single electrodes (Frederick Haer; impedance range 0.8 -4 667 M) were lowered using a microdrive (NAN Instruments) until the waveforms of single neuron(s) 668
were isolated. Neurons were selected for study solely on the basis of the quality of isolation, not 669 on task-related response properties. Cells were isolated and recorded with a Plexon system. 670 671
General behavioral techniques. Animals were habituated to laboratory conditions and then 672 trained to perform oculomotor tasks for liquid reward before training on the task. Previous 673 training history for these subjects included two types of foraging tasks, intertemporal choice 674 tasks, two types of gambling tasks, attentional tasks, and a basic form of a reward-based decision 675 task. Eye position was sampled at 1000 Hz by an infrared eye-monitoring camera system (SR 676
Research). Stimuli were controlled by a computer running MATLAB (The MathWorks) with 677
Psychtoolbox and Eyelink Toolbox. Visual stimuli were presented on a computer monitor placed 678 57 cm from the animal and centered on its eyes. A standard solenoid valve controlled the 679 duration of juice delivery. The relationship between solenoid open time and juice volume was 680 established and confirmed before, during, and after recording. 681 682
These subjects had never been trained on tasks in which rule-reward mappings changed rapidly 683 and required constant learning. Specifically, all previous training involved dynamic tasks in 684 which risky or certain options varied unpredictably across trials or across short blocks. Subjects 685 were, however, familiar with several tasks. These included a diet selection task (Blanchard &  686 Hayden, 2014), a token gambling task ( 2016). In all of these tasks, there was no consistent relationship between spatial location and 689 reward, and thus, subjects had no past opportunity to form a link between rewards and spatial 690 positions. 691 692 Behavioral task. This task has been described in detail previously Sleezer et 693 al., 2016; . This present task is a version of the CSST: an analogue of 694 the WCST that was developed for use in nonhuman primates (Moore et al., 2005) . Task stimuli  695 are similar to those used in the human WCST, with two dimensions (color and shape) and six 696 specific rules (three shapes: circle, star, and triangle; three colors: cyan, magenta, and yellow; 697 Figure 1A) . Choosing a stimulus that matches the currently rewarded rule (e.g. any blue shape 698 when the rule is blue; any color of star when the rule is star) results in visual feedback indicating 699 that the choice is correct (a green outline around the chosen stimulus) and, after a 500 ms delay, 700 a juice reward. Choosing a stimulus that does not match the current rule results in visual 701 feedback indicating that the choice is incorrect (a red outline around the chosen stimulus), and no 702 reward for the trial. 703 704
The rewarded rule was fixed for block of trials. At the start of each block, the rewarded rule was 705 drawn randomly. Blocks lasted until monkeys achieved 10, 15, 20, or 30 correct responses that 706 matched the current rule (fixed across sessions). This meant that blocks lasted for a variable 707 number of total trials, determined by both how long it took monkeys to discover the correct 708 objective rule and how effectively monkeys exploited the correct rule, once discovered. Block 709 changes were uncued, although reward-omission for a previously rewarded option provided 710 unambiguous information that the reward contingencies had changed. 711 712
On each trial, three stimuli were presented asynchronously. One stimulus was presented at each 713 of three locations on the screen. The color, shape, position, and order of stimuli were 714 randomized. Stimuli were presented for 400 msec and were followed by a 600-msec blank 715 period. (The blank period is omitted in Figure 1A because of space constraints). Monkeys were 716 free to look at the stimuli as they appeared, which they typically did . 717
After the third stimulus presentation and blank period, all three stimuli reappeared 718 simultaneously with an equidistant central fixation spot. When they were ready to make a 719 decision, monkeys fixated on the central spot for 100 msec and then indicate their choice by 720
shifting gaze to one stimulus and maintaining fixation on it for 250 msec. If the monkeys broke 721 fixation within 250 milliseconds, they could either again fixate the same option or change their 722 mind and choose a different option, although they seldom did so. Thus, the task allowed the 723 monkeys ample time to deliberate over their options, come to a choice, and even change their 724 mind, without penalty of error. 725 726
General data analysis techniques. Data were analyzed with MATLAB. Two sample t-tests were 727 used for all pair-wise statistical comparisons except for the mutual information analyses because 728 these samples visibly deviated from the normality assumptions of the test. Neural activity was 729 analyzed in the fixed 3350 ms epoch that started at the presentation of the first option and ended 730 just before feedback was provided. Firing rates were z-scored within neurons for all analyses, 731 except in direct comparisons of total firing rate across rule-based and rule-free decisions (e.g. 732 Figure 2 ), where firing rates were centered, but not scaled. All pseudopopulation results are 733 reported for a single, randomly-seeded pseudopopulation, but were confirmed with 1) different 734 random seeds, and 2) bootstrap tests across 1000 random seeds. 735 736
Identifying information-maximizing choices: We determined how much information would be 737 gained from different choice strategies with a model that used the recent history of rewards and 738 choices to estimate the likelihood that each feature was the correct one . The 739
influence of past outcomes and choices decays exponentially (Lau & Glimcher, 2005) , so we 740 took advantage of the fact that the last trial has the single largest influence on choice to construct 741 a simplified model with a 1-trial history. Assuming all possible histories of choices and rewards 742 before the last trial (X 1:t-2 ), we initialize a uniform prior that each feature (f) of the N f features is 743
the correct feature (f*): 744 745 746 747
After a choice is made at time t-1, we calculate the likelihood that the chosen feature was correct 748 in a reward-dependent fashion. If the choice is rewarded (r=1), the likelihood is: 749 750 751 752
If the choice is not rewarded, the likelihood is: 753 754 755 756
Multiplying the prior and likelihood and renormalizing into a valid probability distribution would 757
give the posterior probability that each feature is best after t-1, which is also the new prior at the 758 start of the rule-free trial t. Because we knew, on average, whether or not the monkeys had been 759 rewarded for the last choice before a rule-free decision, we calculate the average prior for rule 760 free decisions by taking an average of these two likelihoods, weighted by the probability that 761 they occurred: 762 763 764 765
To determine how different rule free choices would change the information about what choice is 766 best, we first calculate the entropy of the prior: 767 768 769 770
Then, we calculate the posterior distribution that we would observe after rule-free choices. We 771 first calculate the likelihoods, as described above, for all possible combinations of choice (c t ) and 772 reward outcome (r t ), then multiply each likelihood with the prior to get all possible posterior 773 distributions after the rule-free choice: 774 775 776
There were two possible outcomes of each choice-one where the animal would be rewarded, 777
and one where they would not-and the likelihood of these futures differed systematically across 778 the different choices. Therefore, the estimated posterior entropy for each choice is an average of 779 these possible futures, weighted by their likelihood of occurring: 780 781 782 783
Where the probability of reward for each choice is just the probability that the choice will 784
include the best feature: 785 786 787 788
The information maximizing choice is then one that would cause the largest drop in the model's 789 uncertainty about what feature is correct. That is, it would be the choice, c, that maximizes: 790 791 792 793
Small amounts of noise, |Ν(0, 10 -4 )|, were added to all 0's so that information would be 794 computable. Choices were then classified as differing in 0, 1, or 2 stimulus features from the last 795 choice and the average information gain across these classes is illustrated in the inset of Figure  796 1G. 797 798
Hidden Markov model (HMM): A hidden Markov model was used to infer the latent goal state 799
underlying each choice. This model allowed us ask whether, for example, each blue-star choice 800 was made because 1) it was a star, 2) it was blue, or 3) the monkey was searching for the correct 801 feature. We have previously used this method to identify latent goal states in other tasks (Ebitz, 802 Albarran, & Moore, 2018) and described how this model was developed for this task (Ebitz et  803 al., 2019). 804 805
Briefly, in an HMM framework, choices (y) are "emissions" that are generated by an unobserved 806 decision process that is in a latent, hidden state (z). Each hidden state has some observation 807 model, which dictates the probability of choosing each option when the process that state. For 808 example, the blue-rule state had an observation model where the probability of choosing the blue 809 option was 1, but the probability of choosing a non-blue option was 0. Formally: 810 811 812 813
Conversely, because we do not know what monkeys would choose in a rule-free state, the 814 observation model for any of the N=3 choice options (n) during rule-free states is: 815 816 817 818
In addition to these observation models, the hidden states are also defined by how long the 819 process will tend to stay in that state and where the process will tend to go from that state. 820
Because the model is Markovian (the current state is conditionally independent of all previous 821 history, given the last state), these properties are described by a stochastic transmission matrix, 822 whose entries are the probability of transitioning from each state to every other state, including 823
itself. Monkeys could not divine the new rule following a change point and instead had to 824 explore to discover it, so direct transitions between different rule states were fixed at 0. For the 825 same reason, the monkeys were also assumed to start in the rule-free state on the first trial each 826 day. Transmission parameters were tied across the six rule states, meaning that the model 827 ultimately had only 2 free parameters: the probability of staying in the rule-free state and the 828 probability of staying in any of the six rule-based states. 829 830
These two parameters were fit to each individual session via expectation-maximization using the 831
Baum Welch algorithm (Bilmes, 1998; Murphy, 2012) . This algorithm finds a (possibly local) 832 maxima of the complete-data likelihood, which is related to the joint probability of the hidden 833 state sequence Z and the sequence of observed choices Y. The algorithm was reinitialized with 834 random seeds 100 times, and the model that maximized the observed (incomplete) data log 835 likelihood was ultimately taken as the best for each session. We then used the Viterbi algorithm 836 to identify the most probable a posteriori latent state underlying each choice (Murphy, 2012), 837
given the sequence of choices and the model we fit. 838 839
Mutual information: To estimate the amount of choice information in single neurons, we 840 calculated mutual information between firing rate (r) and choice identity (c) as: 841 842 843 844
Firing rates were discretized via quantile binning within neurons to allow us to calculate these 845 probabilities directly. Two firing rate bins per neuron were used because maximized the number 846 of observations per condition (combination of stimulus identity and firing rate), though the 847 results were similar with more firing rate bins. 848 849
The monkeys completed fewer rule-free trials than rule-based ones, and mutual information 850 estimates are systematically inflated when the number of observations is low (Panzeri et al., 851 2007) due to limited-sampling biases. We controlled for this bias in two ways. First, we 852 randomly downsampled the rule-based trials to match the count of rule-free trials and report the 853 results of this downsampled distribution in the text and figure. Second, we calculated the 854 expected mutual information under the hypothesis of no relationship between choice and firing 855 rate in each case, including these as reference lines in the plot. 856 857
Sparsity and the Gini index: The Gini index is a measure of the sparsity of the distribution of 858 some resource (in this case, spikes) across a population (in this case, neurons). Here, a sparse 859 distribution is one in which a disproportionate number the total population spikes were emitted 860 by a small number of neurons. The Gini index has a few nice properties for measuring spike 861 sparsity in that it is scale-invariant in terms of both the number of spikes and the number of 862 neurons and it is sensitive to the addition of long-tail outliers, both in terms of very low and very 863 high firing neurons (Hurley & Rickard, 2009 ). 864 865
Given a sorted vector of mean firing rates for n neurons (a sorted pseudotrial, see below), x = [x 1 866 , x 2 … x n ], where x 1 ≤ x 2 ≤ x n , the Gini index is calculated as: 867 868 869 870
To give an intuition for this measure, the Gini index quantifies the area under the curve in a plot 871 of the cumulative total population spikes against the cumulative total number of neurons ( Figure  872 S1A). If each neuron contributed equally to the total spike count, this plot would follow unity 873 and the Gini index would equal 0.5. As more and more neurons are silent (equivalently, as more 874 of the spikes are concentrated in a smaller number of neurons), this curve will deviate more from 875 the unity line and the Gini index will approach 1. The Gini index was calculated for each 876 pseudotrial, using the same pseudotrial matrix illustrated in Figure 4 . pseudopopulation approach does not allow us to reconstruct the covariance structure between 883 simultaneously recorded neurons, it can still be useful for generating first order insights into how 884 population activity changes across various conditions. 885 886
Within each task condition (combination of chosen color, shape, and state), firing rates from 887 separately recorded neurons were randomly drawn with replacement to create a pseudotrial firing 888 rate vector for that task condition, with each entry corresponding to the activity of one neuron in 889 that condition. Together, these pseudotrial vectors were stacked into the trials-by-neurons 890 pseudopopulation matrix. Twenty pseudotrials were drawn for each condition, based on the 891
observation that approximately 75% of conditions had at least this number of observations (mean 892 per neuron per condition = 28, median = 26). If a small number of conditions were missing for a 893 particular neuron (<5), we imputed the neurons' mean firing rate. If a large number of conditions 894
were missing, the neuron was excluded from these analyses. Neurons were also excluded if their 895 mean firing rate was less than 2 spikes/second (Mante et al., 2013) . Four of 422 neurons were 896 excluded by these criteria, all of which were in VS. All reported pseudopopulation results come 897 from a single pseudopopulation, but were confirmed by bootstrap tests across 1000 randomly re-898 seeded pseudopopulations. 899 900
We constructed a total of three different pseudotrial matrices, as illustrated in Figures 5, 6, and 7 . 901
These differed only in how we defined "state". The first pseudopopulation (Figure 4) was 902
constructed without respect to the specific rule that monkeys were using (i.e. all rule-based blue-903 star choices were combined, regardless of whether the rule was choose-blue or choose-star). We 904 took this approach because we had no knowledge of which, if any, stimulus features were 905 relevant during rule-free decisions. By creating a rule-based pseudopopulation without respect to 906 the specific rule, we equated our knowledge about the two conditions and isolated any changes in 907 choice representations during rule-based and rule-free decision-making. The second 908 pseudopopulation (Figure 5) included information about whether the rule was color-based or 909
shape-based, but not any information about whether it was a circle, star, or triangle shape-based 910 rule, for example. This allowed us to isolate the effects of rule domain on stimulus feature 911
representations. Finally, the third pseudopopulation (Figure 6) , included information about the 912 specific rule that the monkeys were choosing (blue-rule, or circle-rule). This allowed us to 913 determine how specific rules affected rule-relevant and rule-irrelevant choice dimensions. 914 915
Representational Similarity Analysis: To measure the representational similarity between 916 different choices in a pseudopopulation, we first calculated the geometric mean choice 917 representation within combinations of choice identity and choice type. Then, we measured the 918
Euclidian distance between all pairs of mean choice representations. This created a matrix of 919 pairwise distances between choice representations (e.g. Figure 4 and 5) in arbitrary units, which 920 was zscored for all reported analyses. All analyses and zscoring excluded the distance between 921 the chosen stimulus identity and itself, which was 0 by definition. Representational similarity 922 matrixes are illustrated as the average of 500 randomly seeded pseudopopulations, but all 923 statistical tests were performed on a single pseudopopulation. 924 925
Category and identity tuning in single neurons: To determine whether choice category (versus 926 identity) tuning was increased in single neurons during rule-based decision-making, we first 927 quantified the extend of stimulus identity tuning in single neurons with an ANOVA. Here, we 928 modeled the firing rate Y on a given trial k where choice i was made as: 929 930 931 932
Where stimulus i was identity-coded, meaning that each of the 9 unique possible combinations of 933 color and shape were modeled independently. For each neuron, we then calculated the extent to 934 which this model captured the variance in the neural data by calculating the F-test statistic of this 935 ANOVA: 936 937 938 939
Next, we did the same with a model that independently modeled the contribution of the chosen 940 stimulus color and shape to firing rate: 941 942 943 944
In this model, color and shape effects are assumed to be independent and additive. That is, this 945 model assumes that there is no encoding of stimulus identity beyond what can be explained by 946 separately knowing how a neuron responds to chosen color and shape. Again, we calculated how 947 well this model captured firing rates via its F-test statistic: 948 949 950 951
These two models were fit separately to each neuron during rule-based and rule-free decisions, 952
respectively. We then calculated the relative extent of stimulus identity and stimulus category 953 tuning during the two types of decisions with a "identity-category index", which is a ratio of the 954 F-test statistics of the choice identity and choice category models: 955 956 957 958
Here, a value greater than 1 would indicate that independently modeling each choices' identity 959 improved model fit, compared to modeling only choice category. Conversely, a value equal to or 960 less than 1 would indicate that choice category information was sufficient to explain the variance 961 in firing rate during decision-making. 962 963
Choice predictive subspace analyses: To identify choice-predictive subspaces, we used a form 964 of targeted dimensionality reduction based on multinomial logistic regression (Ebitz et al., 2018) . 965
Targeted dimensionality reduction is a class of methods for re-representing high-dimensional 966 neural activity in a small number of dimensions that correspond to variables of interest in the 967 data ( activity by projecting it onto the axes that capture the most variability in the data-targeted 970 dimensionality reduction reduces dimensionality projecting activity onto axes that encode task 971 information or predict behavior. 972 973
Here, we were interested in how rule-based decision-making changed how choices were 974
represented, so we first identified the axes in neural activity that predicted choice. The design of 975 this task allowed us to dissociate choice-predictive axes from axes that encoded rule information 976 because the same choice could be generated in three ways: via color-rule, shape-rule, or rule-free 977
computations. Because these occurred in roughly equal proportion (33% of trials were rule-free, 978
while 67% were distributed evenly across shape and color rules), we could identify the axes that 979 predicted choice, regardless of why this choice was made. 980 981
